Research & Publications
I. Pain Project
The phenomenon of pain is commonly understood in terms of a corresponding phenomenal quality: there is a certain subjective feeling of what it is typically like for us to experience pain in contrast to, for example, itches, anger, or sadness. This phenomenal character fixes the class of phenomena to be considered pains. This is merely the starting point, however. Most researchers ultimately aim to explain and predict the circumstances under which pains occur. To do so, they search for a certain type of property that is common to all pains and at the same time specific to pains, besides the previously described subjective feeling. Depending on the field of research different types of properties are under consideration. The guiding question of my pain project is whether there exists a certain type of property, synchronic or diachronic, that is common to all pains and pains only; and if not, which consequences we need to draw from such insight.
Phenomenal Quality & Memory
Pain is one of the most unique experiences we undergo in life. In most cases, we can identify pains as pains in a straightforward manner from a first-person perspective. The corresponding subjective feeling has been addressed in the philosophical literature under different labels – phenomenal quality, qualitative character, or quale. In one subproject, I provide an overview concerning different possibilities of how to analyze said phenomenal quality and discuss the most promising interpretations of the ‘orthodox view’. In another subproject, I develop a consistent multidimensional interpretation of a possible phenomenal quality for pain and put it to the test with regard to conceptual and empirical challenges. Moreover, in a commentary on the work of Barbara Montero, I address the question of which conditions need to be met in order for us to plausibly assume the lack of a qualitative memory for pain.
Related Publications
Research Articles
Coninx, S. (in progress): paper on interpretations of the orthodox view, arguing for the existence of a pain quality
Coninx, S. (2021): A Multidimensional Phenomenal Space for Pain: Structure, Primitiveness, and Utility. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. Publication
Commentary
Coninx, S. (2020): Pain, Amnesia, and Qualitative Memory – Conceptual and Empirical Challenges. Commentary on Barbara Montero’s paper ‘What Experience Doesn’t Teach: Pain-Amnesia and a New Paradigm for Memory Research.’ Journal of Consciousness Studies, 27(11-12), 126-133. Publication Draft
Bodily Sensations & Intentionalism
In due consideration of recent empirical research, I aim to show in different subprojects that there exists no property common to all pains and pains only. This is due to the substantial variation across pains and the systematic similarity between pain and other phenomena, including emotions and other bodily sensations. In particular, I argue against strong intentionalist theories presuming the existence of a certain type of intentional content necessary and sufficient for pain. First, I aim to show that strong representationalist theories of bodily sensations do not provide convincing evidence in terms of causal covariance and biological function. Second, strong imperative theories have clear advantages in highlighting the relevance of action but cannot tell an overall conclusive story for the introduction of an intentional content satisfying the criteria of necessity and sufficiency.
Related Publications
Research Articles
Coninx, S. (2021): Strong Representationalism and Bodily Sensations: Reliable Causal Covariance and Biological Function. Philosophical Psychology, 34(2), 210-232. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2020.1858476 Publication Draft
Coninx, S. (2020): Pain Experiences and Their Link to Action: Challenging Imperative Theories. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 27(9-10), 1104-126. Publication
Neurophilosophy & Family Resemblance
There is nothing common to all pains and pains only, even if, subjectively, they may appear to us as a phenomenologically unified class of phenomena. This becomes particularly clear when we take a closer look at the neural systems involved in pain processing. Nonetheless, I think that it is possible to develop an empirically adequate and scientifically useful theory of pain that provides a guiding heuristic for future research projects. Such a theory needs to focus on the resemblance relations that hold between the properties of individual pain cases. In my opinion, this allows us to bridge the gap between idiosyncrasy and generalizability. Thereby, I argue against accounts of scientific pain eliminativism.
Related Publications
Monography
Coninx, S. (2020): Experiencing Pain: A Scientific Enigma & Its Philosophical Solution. De Gruyter.
Publication Reading Sample
Research Article
Coninx, S. (2021): The Notorious Neurophilosophy of Pain: A Family Resemblance Approach to Idiosyncracy and Generalizability. Mind & Language. Publication
Others
Coninx, S. (2018): The Frustrating Family of Pain. iCog Blog. Blog Post Draft
II. Situated Affectivity & Clinical Practice
In my recent research, I address the more general phenomenon of human affectivity and suffering, connecting my previous research on pain with knowledge concerning other affective phenomena, including grief, loneliness, and depression. This research field is of particular relevance in its application to clinical contexts. I am therefore increasingly concerned with the interface between philosophy, clinical medicine, and psychiatry, whereby the influences of situated approaches come into play concerning concepts of affordances, scaffolds, and niche construction. In particular, I address the question of the extent to which environmental conditions shape our affective lives and can be actively used, for example, in therapeutic contexts.
Affective Scaffolding & Negative Niche Construction
I consider the application of concepts of situated approaches to affective phenomena as promising. This requires, however, a detailed understanding of such concepts. In cooperation with Achim Stephan, I argue that the concept of scaffolding can contribute to a better understanding of our affective life and the complex manners in which it is shaped by environmental entities. We develop a taxonomy along paradigmatic examples of affective scaffolding which emphasizes distinctions that are often conflated and identifies commonly overlooked fields of application. Further, I am currently working on the negative aspects of niche construction across different spatio-temporal units of analysis, using chronic pain as an illustrative case study.
Related Publications
Research Articles
Coninx, S. (in progress): paper on negative niche construction and the role that conflicts between processes located at different spatio-temporal scales can play for our understanding of modern challenges in medicine and public health care
Coninx, S. & Stephan, A. (2021): A Taxonomy of Environmentally Scaffolded Affectivity. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, 54, 38–64. Publication
Affordance-Based Models of Chronic Pain
In cooperation with Peter Stilwell, I have developed an affordance-based approach to chronic pain. In our first paper, we conceptualize differences between acute and chronic pain, as well as the process of chronification, in terms of changes in the field of affordances. This is, in terms of the possibilities for action perceived by subjects in pain. In a second paper, we collaborate with Michael Ray, aiming to further unpack the complex concepts of an affordances-based model of chronic pain and explore its potential for clinical practice and health care.
Related Publications
Research Articles
Coninx, S., Ray, M., & Stilwell, P. (under review): paper on the core concepts of affordances-based models of chronic pain and their potential for clinical practice and health care
Coninx, S. & Stilwell, P. (2021): Pain and the Field of Affordances – An Enactive Approach to Acute and Chronic Pain. Synthese, 199, 7835–7863. Publication
Bio-psycho-social Models & Enactivism
In one subproject, Peter Stilwell and I argue that due to its limited theoretical foundation, the biopsychosocial model is too often implemented in a reductionist, fragmented, and linear manner. In particular, it remains too vague concerning the integration of the involved biological, psychological, and social processes. We differentiate five facets of such integration problem: (i) ontological, (ii) conceptual, (iii) explanatory, (iv) methodological, and (v) therapeutic. Further, we develop an enactive theory of chronic pain and outline how far it provides solutions to these different integration challenges. In another subproject with Ben Cormack and Jo Gibson, we show that many applications of the biopsychosocial model in recent clinical practice deviate from the original ideas of George Engel. We show that these deviations have led to suboptimal patient care and indicate more promising alternatives relying on humanistic and enactive principles.
Related Publications
Research Articles
Coninx, S. & Stilwell, P. (under review): paper on the challenges of integration and how an enactive approach might address them
Cormack, B., Stilwell, P., Coninx, S., & Gibson, J. (under review): paper on the bio-psycho-social model and its misapplications in recent clinical practice
Others
Stilwell, P. & Coninx, S. (2021). A New Paradigm to Understand Pain. IAI News. Blog Post Draft
III. Folk Concept of Pain
IV. Social Understanding
Theories of social understanding have moved away from arguing that just one epistemic strategy constitutes our ability of social understanding. In contrast, the empirical evidence seems to support a pluralistic approach. In cooperation with Albert Newen and Julia Wolf, we aim to defend in different subprojects a pluralistic view, but highlight two open questions: what is the residual role of mindreading within this framework, and how do different strategies of social understanding relate to each other? That is, we aim to clarify the arguments that might be considered in evaluating the role that epistemic strategies play in a pluralistic framework: frequency, centrality, and reliability. On this basis, we argue that mindreading constitutes a core strategy in human social life. Further, we provide an account of the relation and dynamic interaction between different epistemic strategies in social understanding.
Related Publications
Research Articles
Coninx, S. & Newen, A. (2018): Theories of Understanding Others: The Need of a New Account and the Guiding Role of the Person Model Theory. Belgrade Philosophical Annual, 31, 127-153. Publication
Wolf, J., Coninx, S. & Newen, A. (2021): Rethinking Integration of Epistemic Strategies in Social Understanding: Examining the Central Role of Mindreading in Pluralist Accounts. Erkenntnis. Publication
Conference Proceeding
Wolf, J. & Coninx, S. (2021): The Role of Mindreading in a Pluralist Framework of Social Cognition. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society 43, 341-3047. Publication
Publications
Monography
2020
1. Coninx, S.: Experiencing Pain – A Scientific Enigma & Its Philosophical Solution. de Gruyter. Publication Cover Reading Sample
Peer-Reviewed Research Articles
2021
2. Coninx, S.: The Notorious Neurophilosophy of Pain: A Family Resemblance Approach to Idiosyncrasy and Generalizability. Mind & Language. Publication
3. Coninx, S.: A Multidimensional Phenomenal Space for Pain: Structure, Primitiveness, and Utility. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. Publication
4. Coninx, S.: Strong Representationalism and Bodily Sensations: Reliable Causal Covariance and Biological Function. Philosophical Psychology, 34(2), 210-232. Publication Draft
5. Coninx, S. & Stilwell, P.: Pain and the Field of Affordances – An Enactive Approach to Acute and Chronic Pain. Synthese, 199, 7835–7863. Publication
6. Coninx, S. & Stephan, A.: A Taxonomy of Environmentally Scaffolded Affectivity. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, 54, 38–64. Publication
7. Wolf, J., Coninx, S. & Newen, A.: Rethinking Integration of Epistemic Strategies in Social Understanding: Examining the Central Role of Mindreading in Pluralist Accounts. Erkenntnis. Publication
2020
8. Coninx, S.: Pain Experiences and Their Link to Action: Challenging Imperative Theories. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 27(9-10), 104-126. Publication
2018
9. Coninx, S. & Newen, A.: Theories of Understanding Others: The Need of a New Account and the Guiding Role of the Person Model Theory. Belgrade Philosophical Annual, 31, 127-153. Publication
Commentaries
2020
10. Coninx, S.: Pain, Amnesia, and Qualitative Memory – Conceptual and Empirical Challenges. Commentary on Barbara Montero’s paper “What Experience Doesn’t Teach: Pain-Amnesia and a New Paradigm for Memory Research.” Journal of
Consciousness Studies, 27(11-12), 126-133. Publication Draft
Conference Proceedings
2021
11. Wolf, J. & Coninx, S.: The Role of Mindreading in a Pluralist Framework of Social Cognition. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society 43, 3041-3047. Publication